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DE HERNANDEZ (cocaine smug-
gler) 
Cert to CA9 
(Goodwin & Tang) (pc) (Jame-
son, vdj, dissenting) 
Federal/Criminal Timely 
SUMMARY: The SG contends that CA9 erred in sup-
pressing 88 cocaine-filled balloons excreted by resp, who was 
detained at the border by Customs Officials for the period of 
time necessary to examine her bowel movements. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Shortly after midnight on 
March 5, 1983, resp arrived at the Los Angeles airport on a 
flight from Bogota, Colombia. After passing through an immigra-
tion checkpoint, she proceeded to a Customs inspection area 
where, following a review of her travel documents, she was re-
ferred to a secondary inspection area. There, a Customs inpector 
inspected resp' s passport and luggage and questioned her about 
her trip to the United States. The interview revealed that resp 
came from a source country for narcotics, had previously made 
numerous trips of short duration into the United States, had paid 
cash for her ticket, carried little extra clothing or toiletries, 
carried $5000 in cash, had no confirmed hotel reservations, had 
no family or friends in the United States, and spoke no English. 
Resp claimed she had come to the United States to purchase cloth-
ing and other merchandise for her husband's business, but ac-
knowledged she had made no appointments to visit potential sell-
ers. Based on his observations, the inspector immediately sus-
pected that resp was carrying drugs internally, as she matched 
the common profile of such a drug smuggler. 
The inspector referred resp to another room for a pat-
down search, which failed to reveal contraband. He then asked 
resp if she would consent to an x-ray search of her abdominal 
cavity; she initially consented, but revoked the consent when she 
learned she would be handcuffed on the way to a hospital for the 
x-ray. Customs officials then contacted Customs Special Agent 
Windes and requested him to seek a court order for an x-ray 
search. He declined to do so, but informed resp that she had 
three options: to consent to an x-ray search, remain in custody 
until she had a bowel movement, or return to Colombia on the next 
available flight. Resp chose the latter, but was informed that 
she would be kept under observation during her wait for the 
flight; if she excreted any contraband, she would be arrested. 
It turned out that no flight was available for many hours. Resp 
remained under the continuous observation of Customs officers in 
their waiting room for 16 hours, during which time she refused to 
eat or drink, or to use toilet facilities. 
At approximately 3:00 p.m. on March 5, female officers 
subjected resp to a second strip search, 1 which failed to reveal 
any evidence of contraband. At this point, Special Agent Windes 
decided to seek a court order for x-ray and body cavity searches; 
his affidavit included the facts that resp had refused to eat, 
drink, or use toilet facilities during the 16-hour detention. At 
about midnight, a federal magistrate issued the order, and resp 
was transported to a hospital. There, a rectal examination re-
vealed a balloon containing cocaine. Resp was arrested and 
placed in the prison ward of the hospital; over the next four 
days, she excreted 88 balloons containing 528.4 grams of cocaine. 
Prior to trial, resp moved to suppress the cocaine on 
1 It is not entirely clear either from the SG's brief or the 
court's opinions when the first strip search occurred. 
Apparently, it occurred at the time of the pat-down search, prior 
to the detention. 
'"'-'• v-z-, _,_,-~L.Y 
the ground that the affidavit supporting the court order for the 
body cavity search was tainted by information received during the 
unlawful detention of her for 16 hours. The DC denied the mo-
tion, holding that the Customs officials' initial questioning of 
resp had given them "a very substantial suspicion" that she was 
smuggling narcotics internally. This suspicion justified their 
seeking her consent to an x-ray search and upon her refusal, in 
detaining her until she could either be placed on a return flight 
or had a bowel movement that would confirm or deny their suspi-
cions. Thus, the detention was lawful, and further information 
received during it that supported the court order was not taint-
ed. 
A divided panel of CA9 reversed. It held that the de-
tention was unlawful and therefore, that the information obtained 
during the detention tainted the court order and the results of 
the body cavity search. Because at the time of the initial ques-
tioning, the Customs agents lacked the necessary "clear indica-
tion" resp was smuggling drugs internally that was required to 
obtain a court-ordered x-ray search, it was also unlawful for 
them to detain her without such a level of suspicion. 
Judge Jameson (dj, Montana) dissented. The agents had a 
strong suspicion she was smuggling drugs; this was sufficient to 
justify the first strip search. The detention to await resp's 
bowel movement was no more intrusive than a strip search, since 
both involve only "passive visual inspection of the body's sur-
face and, in this case, its waste products." Thus, the detention 
was lawful. Body cavity and x-ray searches, on the other hand, 
.. 
require a "clear indication" of illegal activity because they 
intrude beyond the body's surface. In addition, smuggling by 
ingestion into the alimentary canal does not leave the same ex-
ternal signs as body cavity smuggling does (e.g., unnatural gait, 
restricted body movements, evidence of lubricants); the reliable 
indicators of alimentary canal smuggling (refusal to eat, drink, 
or use toilet facilities) may only be observed over a period of 
time. Thus, 
suspicion, is 
"a reasonable period of detention, based on a real 
the least intrusive and most reliable means of 
identifying alimentary canal smugglers." 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG contends that cert should be 
granted because CA9's decision on the level of suspicion needed 
to justify a detention to await a bowel movement is in conflict 
with decisions of CAll. In United States v. Mosquera-Ramirez, 
729 F.2d 1352 (CAll 1984), CAll ruled that a 12-hour detention to 
await the deft's bowel movement was not unreasonable. As in this 
case, the agents suspected the deft was smuggling drugs internal-
ly; after he refused to consent to an x-ray search, they detained 
him until he excreted 95 cocaine-filled condoms. The court ruled 
that neither the detention, nor the search of the results of the 
bowel movement, were unreasonable. In contrast, CA9 held that 
detentions must be based on the same high level of suspicion--a 
"clear indication" of internal drug smuggling--necessary to war-
rant a body cavity search. The SG does not contest the use of 
the "clear indication" standard for body cavity searches; it does 
contest the CA9's ruling that a detention to await a bowel move-
ment requires the same level of suspicion. 
1"U o o~- I :J:J-~T.y 
Moreover, both CA5 and CAll have ruled that x-ray 
searches at the border may be conducted on a reasonable suspicion 
that the suspect is smuggling drugs. Neither has required for x-
ray searches the higher level of certainty usually applied only 
to body cavity searches. Finally, CA9's decision also runs 
counter to settled law holding that border searches are governed 
by somewhat less stringent standards than other searches. 
The SG argues that cert should be granted to resolve 
these conflicts and prevent drug smugglers from succeeding in 
their "increasingly adept" methods of smuggling, merely by shift-
ing their operations to points of entry in the Ninth Circuit. 
CA9's decision hamstrings the ability of Customs officials to do 
their job, and does so by restricting the use of a "foolproof and 
relatively unintrusive investigative measure." 
4. DISCUSSION: The SG is correct that CA9's decision 
creates a conflict among the circuits. This appears to be a re-
curring area of Fourth Amendment law and one that has no small 
importance to the government's ability to restrict drug smug-
gling. A response should be called for. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend CFR. 
There is no response. 
January 3, 1985 Simpson Opin in petn 
January 18, 1985 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell April 5, 1985 
From: Lynda 
No. 84-755 United States v. de Hernandez 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether resp, who was reasonably suspected of smuggling 
contraband drugs inside her body and who refused to submit to an 
x-ray search, could lawfully be detained at the border by Customs 
officials for the period of time necessary to examine her bodily 
wastes? 
2. 
Although this case is not directly controlled by any of 
this Court's precedent, I am inclined to believe that CA9 should 
be reversed. As I discuss below, I believe this result follows 
logically from this Court's cases on border searches and a recent 
~~--------------------~----'-----~~ 
case, United States v. Sharpe, No. 83-529 (March 20, 1985), 
involving detentions. I also think that the facts amply 
~------..-.....__ 
demonstrate that the Customs officials acted on a reasonable 
suspicion that resp was carrying drugs internally. If you want a -----supplemental memo from me explaining why I think this is so, I 
will be happy to provide one. ~ 
This Court's cases have long since established that 
searches and seizures at the country's borders are subject to 
different, more relaxed constitutional standards than typical 
Terry stops conducted within the country. ~.,United States v. 
Ramsey, 431 u.s. 606, 619 (1977). Such relaxed standards are 
based in part on Congress's broad constitutional power to 
regulate commerce, and have long been recognized as necessary to 
prevent smuggling and the entry of prohibited articles. Id. 
Consequently, routine border searches have never been thought to 
be subject to the warrant requirement or the usual requirement - -----
that a search be based on probable cause. Id. , at 617-619. 1 
1The SG also argues that resp is entitled to lesser Fourth 
Amendment protection because she is an alien. Under my view of 
the case, the Court need not reach this~estion, and I believe 
it should avoid it i 1t can. esp persuas1 ely argues, however, 
that because resp had already been "admitted" by immigration 
officials before Customs officials began their investigation of 
Footnote continued on next page. 
3. 
Indeed, resp concedes that the actions of Customs officials in 
stopping and questioning her were reasonable; the question 
presented here is whether the initial seizure of resp, and the 
--------------------------------------fruits of the eventual search, were made unlawful by the length 
of time the Customs officials detained her, once she refused to 
consent to an x-ray search. 
-- '"'--:?' v"' 
This Court recently noted in New Jersey v. T.L.O., No. 
83-712 (January 15, 1985), that what is a reasonable search or 
seizure "depends on the context within which the search takes 
place." Slip op., at 10. The Court ruled that 11 [w] here a 
careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests 
-1· 1..-- .b. that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment 
standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we 
/ 
have not hesitated to adopt such a standard." Id., at 14. The 
Court, and you in particular, frequently have observed that the 
public and the government have an especially compelling interest 
in preventing drug trafficking. 
------1617 (June 20, 1983), slip 
Mendenhall, 446 u.s. 544, 
United States v. Place, No. 81-
op., at 7· , United States v. 
561-562 (1980) (Powell, J. , 
concurring). All of these factors point toward requiring some 
lessened standard of reasonableness in the case at bar. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Court has held that 
some border searches without a warrant and without probable cause 
her, she is entitled to many of the same constitutional 
protections as citizens. This result would logically follow from 
language in Landon v. Plascencia, 459 u.s. 21 (1982). 
4. 
are permissible, however, most of those cases have been based in 
part on the fact that the length of time the person was stopped 
was brief and the intrusion minimal. ~-, United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 u.s. 873, 880 (1975) (Powell, J.). And, in 
United States v. Ramsey, supra, the Court expressly left open the 
possibility that a border search might be deemed unreasonable 
because of the .. particularly offensive manner in which it is 
carried out ... 431 u.s., at 618 n. 13. Thus, resp argues that 
the 16 hours she was detained makes unlawful the seizure of her 
-----.. 
and the resulting search that produced the evidence she was 
smuggling cocaine. 
There is support, however, in this Court's cases 
justifying the length of the detention under the circumstances. 
/ 
In United States v. Sharpe, No. 83-529 (March 20, 1985), the C <r 
Court noted that although brevity is an important factor in 
determining the reasonableness of the seizure of an individual 
based on a reasonable suspicion standard, the Court must also 
consider 11 the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop 
~ 
as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those 
Id., slip op., at 10. Here, as noted above, the 
purposes of preventing drug trafficking and protecting the 
country at the border from the entry of unlawful articles are 
compelling law enforcement goals. Likewise, the SG persuasively 
argues that a long time period may often be required in cases of 
this type before the suspect will excrete the bodily wastes 
needed to be examined • 
. •' 
::~. 
The Court in Sharpe also held that a detention of some 
length is more likely to be permissible when the police act 
diligently and do not unnecessarily prolong the detention. Id., 
at 9. This is especially true where the suspect's own actions 
have contributed to the added delay about which he complains. 
Id . , at 12-13 • Here, there is no allegation that the Customs 
officials did anything to add to the length of resp's detention. 
In fact, as the SG points out, the length of the detention was -largely within resp's control, as she could have eliminated it 
entirely by consenting to an x-ray search, or by agreeing to 
excrete her wastes sooner. 
Finally, the Sharpe Court noted that in determining the 
reasonableness of a detention based on reasonable suspicion, 
courts should look to whether alternatives to detention were 
available and whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to 
pursue them. !d., at 11. Here, Customs officials attempted to 
pursue the only other alternative to detention--conducting an x-
ray search of resp. As noted above, however, resp refused to 
consent to such a search. The officials were unable to force an 
x-ray search because CA9 law requires a court order for such a 
search, issued on a "clear indication" that the suspect is 
carrying contraband internally. The officials believed that they 
did not have enough information to meet this heightened standard, 
and so, did not pursue a warrant until after the 16-hour 
detention, which produced additional information that enabled 
them to get the warrant. Thus, it cannot be said that the 
6. 
Customs officials unreasonably failed to pursue less intrusive or 
more reasonable alternatives. 
CA9'~ decision is based on the fact that under its case 
law, the Customs officials did not have enough information to 
support a court-ordered x-ray search; hence, according to CA9, 
detaining resp until she produced the same information was 
unlawful. The SG argues, however, that CA9 erred in requiring a 
~ 
warrant for an on less than probable cause. 
As noted above, warrants are generally not required for border 
searches. United States v. Ramsey, supra. Moreover, as the SG 
notes, the Fourth Amendment requires that "no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause"; the SG argues that where a 
lesser standard applies, a warrant may not be required. In any 
event, I do not believe that the question of the standard of 
reasonableness governing x-ray searches at the border is 
necessarily before the Court. As resp notes, there is no 
evidence in the record on this point. Resp suggests that the -------
Court assume that an x-ray search requires the same level of 
reasonableness as the detention at issue here. As this view 
appears to comport with the SG's position, I recommend it to the 
Court. Then, there will be no problem reconciling this case with 
CA9 's opinion, yet the Court will not reach out to decide an 
issue that is not before it. I cannot imagine, and the SG does 
not argue, that an x-ray search would require a lesser degree of 
suspicion on the part of Customs officials than would a lengthy 
detention of the sort resp endured here. 
7. 
Finally, I would point out that practical 
considerations support reversing CA9. As the SG notes, drug 
smuggling of this type not 
even as many as body cavity smuggling would. See SG's brief 32-
33. To require a "clear indication" that a person was smuggling 
drugs internally before Customs officials could detain him would 
virtually eliminate Customs' ability to stop this type of 
smuggler. 
All things considered, I recommend that you vote to 
reverse CA9. If you would like for me to investigate any of 
1--vo. 
these points in more depth, I would be happy to do so. 
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-755 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ROSA ELVIRA 
MONTOYA DE HERNANDEZ 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1985] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondent Rosa Elvira Montoya de Hernandez was de-
tained by Customs officials upon her arrival at the Los Ange-
les airport on a flight from Bogota, Colombia. She was 
found to be smuggling 88 cocaine-filled balloons in her alimen-
tary canal, and was convicted after a bench trial of various 
federal narcotics offenses. A divided panel of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed her 
convictions, holding that her detention violated the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution because the 
Customs inspectors did not have a "clear indication" of ali-
mentary canal smuggling at the time she was detained. 731 
F. 2d 1369 (1984). Because of a conflict in the decisions of 
the Courts of Appeals on this question and the importance of 
its resolution to the enforcement of Customs laws, we 
granted certiorari. -- U. S. --. We now reverse. 
Respondent arrived at Los Angeles International Airport 
shortly after midnight, March 5, 1983, on Avianca Flight 080, 
a direct 10-hour flight from Bogota, Colombia. vJier visa was 
in order so she was passed thr_ou.$_h }~!!.migration and pro-
ceeded to the Customs ~th'e'CustOnis desk she en-
cou~or Talamantes, who reviewed her 
document oticed from her passport that she had made 
at least 8 recent tr1ps o either Miami or Los Angeles. 
Talamante rre respondent to a secondary Customs' 
84-755--0PINION 
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desk for further questioning. At this desk Talamantes and 
another inspector asked respondent general questions con-
cerning herself and the purpose of her trip. Respondent re-
vealed that she spoke no English and had no family or friends 
in the United State8-:- She" explained in Spanish tllat sfie-had 
come to the United States to purchase goods for her hus-
band's store in Bogota. The Customs mspectors recognized 
Bogota as a "source city" for narcotics. Respondent pos-
sessed $5,00Qjn cash, mostly $50 bills, but had no billfold. 
She indicated to the inspectors that she had no appointdLts 
with merchandise vendors, but planned to ride aroun os 
Angeles in taxicabs visiting retail stores such as J. C. Penney 
and K-Mart in order to buy goods for her husband's store 
with the $5,000. 
Respondent admitted that she had no hotel r~servations, 
but stated that she planned to stay at a Holiday Inn. Re-
spondent could not reca ho her airline ticket was pur-
chased. when-the inspectors opened respondent'8lrn-e small 
va 1se t ey found about 4 changes of "cold weather" clothing. 
Respondent had ~es o ha t e 1g ~she 
was wearing. Although respondent possessed no checks, 
waym s, credit cards, or letters of credit, she did produce a 
Colombian business card and a number of old receipts, way-
bills, and fabric swatches displayed in a photo album. 
At this point Talamantes and the other inspector suspected 
that respondent was a "balloon swallower," one who attempts 
to smuggle narcotics into this country hidden in her alimen-
tary canal. Over the years Inspector Talamantes had appre- ~  
hended dozens of alimentary canal smugglers arriving on 
Avianca Flight 080. See J. A., at 42; United States v. 
Mendez-Jimenez, 709 F. 2d 1300, 1301 (CA9 1983). 
The inspectors requested a female Customs inspector to 
take respondent to a private area and conduct a patdown and 
strip search. During the search the female inspector felt re-
spondent's abdomen area and noticed a firm fullness, as if re-
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contraband but the inspector noticed that respondent was 
wearing two air of elastic under ants with a paper towel lin-
ing the crotch area. 
-~'-
When respondent returned to the Customs area and the fe-
male inspector reported her discoveries, the inspector in 
charge told respondent that he suspected she was smuggling 
drugs in her alimentary canal. Respondent agreed to the in-
spector's request that she be x-rayed at a hospital but in an-
swer to the inspector's query stated that she was pregnant. 
She agreed to a pregnancy test before the x-ray. Respond-
ent withdrew the consent for an x-ray when she learned that 
she would have to be handcuffed en route to the hospital. 
The inspector then gave respondent the option of returning 
to Colombia on the next available flight, agreeing to an x-ray, 
or remaining in detention until she produced a monitored 
bowel movement that would confirm or rebut the inspectors' 
susp1c1ons. Respondent chose the first option and was 
placed in a Customs' office under observation. She was told 
that if she went to the toilet she would have to use a waste-
basket in the women's restroom, in order that female Cus-
toms inspectors could inspect her stool for balloons or cap-
sules carrying narcotics. The inspectors refused 
respondent's request to place a telephone call. 
Respondent sat in the Customs office, under observation, 
for the remainder of the night. During the night Customs 
officials attempted to place respondent on a Mexican airline 
that was flying to Bogota via Mexico City in the morning. 
The airline refused to transport respondent because she 
lacked a MeXIcan v1sa necessary o an 1 Mexico City. Re-
spondent was dot 2_ermitted to ave, and was informed that 
she would be etained until she agreed to an x-ray or her 
bowels moved. She remained detained in the Customs office 
under observation, for most of the time curled up in a chair 
leaning to one side. She refused all offers of food and drink, 
and refused to use the toilet facilities. The Court of Appeals 
.._ -- .-...- ---------~ noted that she exhibited symptoms of discomfort "consistent 
84-755---0PINION 
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with heroic efforts to resist the usual calls of nature." 731 F. 
2d, at 1371. 
At the shift change at 4:00 p. m. the next afternoon, almost 
16 hours after her flight had landed, respondent still had not 
~
defecated or urinated or partaken of food or drink. At that 
time Customs officials sought a court order authorizing a 
pregnancy test, an x-ray, and a rectal examination. The fed-
eral magistrate issued an order just before midnight that 
-~~ 
evening, which authorized a rectal examination and involun-
tary x-ray, provided that the physician in charge considered 
respondent's claim of pregnancy. Respondent was taken to 
a hosptial and given a pr~~ test, which later turned out 
to be negative. Before the results of the pregnancy test 
were known, a physician conducted a rectal examination and 
removed from respondent's rectum a balloon containing a for-
eign substance. Respondent was then placed formally under 
arrest. By 4:10 a. m. respondent had passed 6 similar bal-
loons; over the next 4 days she passed 88 balloons containing 
a total of 528 grams of 80% pure cocaine hydroc -roride. 
Mter a suppression hearing tlie istrict Court admitted 
the cocaine in evidence against respondent. She was con-
victed of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 
U. S. C. §841(a)(1) and unlawful importation of cocaine, 21 
U. S. C. §§ 952(a); 960(a). 
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeal for 
the Ninth Circuit reversed respondent's convictions. The 
Court noted that Customs inspectors had a "justifiably high 
level of official skepticism about respondent's good motives, 
but the inspectors decided to let nature take its course rather 
than seek an immediate magistrate's warrant for an x-ray." 
731 F. 2d, at 1371. Such a magistrate's warrant required a 
"clear indication" or "plain suggestion" that the traveller was 
an alimentary canal smuggler under previous decisions of the 
Court of Appeals. See United States v. Quintero-Castro, 
705 F. 2d 1099 (CA9 1983); United States v. M endez-Jime-
nez, 709 F. 2d 1300, 1302 (CA9 1983); but cf. South Dakota v. 
84-755--0PINION 
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Opperman, 428 U. S. 367, 370 n. 5 (1976). The court applied 
this required level of suspicion to respondent's case. The 
court questioned the "humanity" of the inspectors' decision to 
hold respondent until her bowels moved, knowing that she 
would suffer "many hours of humiliating discomfort if she 
chose not to submit to the x-ray examination." The court 
concluded that under a "clear indication" standard "the evi-
dence available to the customs officers when they decided to 
hold [respondent] for continued observation was insufficient 
to support the 16-hour detention." 731 F. 2d, at 1373. 
Petitioners contend that the Customs inspectors reason-
ably suspected that respondent was an alimentary canal 
smuggler, and this suspicion was sufficient to justify the de-
tention. In support of the judgment below respondent ar-
gues, inter alia, that reasonable suspicion would not support 
respondent's detention, and in any event the inspectors did 
not reasonably suspect that respondent was carrying narcot-
ics internally. 
The Fourth Amendment commands that searches and sei-
zures be reasonable. What is reasonable de ends upon all of 
the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the 
nature of the search or seizure itself. New Jersey v. 
T. L. 0., slip op., at 10-15,-- U. S. -- (1985). The per-
missibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged 
by "balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amend-
ment interests against its promotion of legitimate govern-
mental interests." United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 
103 S. Ct. 2573,- (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 
648, 654 (1979); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 
(1967). 
Here the seizure of respondent took place at the interna-
tional border. Since the founding of our Republic Congress 
hasg:rall(ed the Executive plenary authority to conduct rou-
tine searches and seizures at the border, without probable 
cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the collection of du-
84-755-0PINION 
6 UNITED STATES v. MONTOYA DE HERNANDEZ 
ties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this 
country. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U. S. 606, 
616-617 (1977), citing Act of July 31, 1789, c. 5, 1 Stat. 29. 
This Court has long recognized Congress' power to police en-
trants at the border. See Boyd v. United States, 118 U. S. 
616, 623 (1886). As we stated recently: 
"Import restrictions and searches of persons or packages 
at the national border rest on different considerations 
and different rules of substantive law from domestic 
regulations. The Constitution gives Congress broad 
comprehensive powers '[t]o regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations,' Art. I, cl. 3. Historically such broad 
powers have been necessary to prevent smuggling and to 
prevent articles from entry." 
Ramsey, supra, at 618-619, citing United States v. Thirty-
Seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 376 (1971). 
Consistently, therefore, with Congress' power to protect 
the nation by stopping and examining persons entering this 
country, the Fourth Amendment's balance of reasonableness 
is qualitatively different at the international border than in 
the interior. Routine searches of the persons and effects of 
entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable 
suspicion, probable cause, or warrant, 1 and first-class mail 
may be opened without a warrant on less than probable 
cause, Ramsey, supra. Automotive travellers may be 
stopped at fixed check points near the border without indi-
vidualized suspicion even if the stop is based largely on eth-
nicity, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 
562-563 (1973), and boats on inland waters with ready access 
1 See Ramsey, supra, at 616-619; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 
413 U. S. 266, 272-273 (1973); id., at 288 (WHITE, J., dissenting). As the 
Court stated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 154 (1925): 
"Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary be-
cause of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the 
country to identify himself as entitled to come in and his belongings and 
effects which may be lawfully brought in." 
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to the sea may be hailed and boarded with no suspicion what-
ever. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 Sulp. Ct. 
2573 (1983). TJ 
These cases reflect long-standing concern for the protec-
tion of the integrity of the border. This concern is, if any-
thing, heightened by the veritable national crisis in law en-
forcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics, see United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 561 (1980) (POWELL, J., 
concurring), and in particular by the increasing u'tilizatfon of 
alimentary canal smuggling. This desperate practice ap-
pears to be a relatively recent addition to the smugglers' rep-
ertoire of deceptive practices, and it also appears to be ex-
ceedingly difficult to detect. 2 Congress had recognized 
these difficulties. 19 U. S. C. § 1582 provides that "all per-
sons coming into the United States from foreign countries 
shall be liable to detention and search authorized by [customs 
regulations]." Customs agents may "stop, search and exam-
ine" any "vehicle, beast or person" upon which an officer sus-
• See United States v. DeMontoya, 729 F. 2d 1369 (CAll 1984) (re-
quired surgery; swallowed 100 cocaine-filled condoms); United States v. 
Fino, 729 F. 2d 1357 (CAll 1984) (required surgery; 120 cocaine-filled pel-
lets); United States v. Mejia, 720 F. 2d 1378 (CA5 1983) (75 balloons); 
United States v. Couch, 688 F. 2d 599, 605 (CA9 1982) (36 capsules); 
United States v. Quintero-Castro, 705 F. 2d 1099 (CA9 1983) (120 bal-
loons); United States v. Saldarrianga-Marin, 734 F. 2d 1425 (CAll 1984); 
United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F. 2d 1341 (CAll 1984) (135 condoms); 
United States v. Mendez-Jimenez, 709 F. 2d 1301 (CA9 1983) (102 bal-
loons); United States v. Mosquera-Ramirez, 729 F. 2d 1352 (CAll 1984) 
(95 condoms); United States v. Castrillon, 716 F. 2d 1279 (CA9 1983) (83 
balloons); United States v. Castaneda-Castaneda, 729 F. 2d 1360 (CAll 
1984) (2 smugglers; 201 balloons); United States v. Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723 
F. 2d 1420 (CA9 1984) (85 balloons); United States v. Henao-Castano, 729 
F. 2d 1364 (CAll 1984) (85 condoms); United States v. Ek, 676 F . 2d 379 
(CA9 1982) (30 capsules); United States v. Padilla, 729 F. 2d 1367 (CAll 
1984) (ll5 condoms); United States v. Gomez-Diaz, 712 F. 2d 949 (CA5 
1983) (69 balloons); United States v. D'Allerman, 712 F. 2d 100 (CA5 1983) 
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pects there is contraband or "merchandise subject to duty." 
Id., §482; see also id., §§ 1467; 1481; 19 CFR §§ 162.6, 162.7. 
Balanced against the sovereign's interests at the border 
are the Fourth Amendment rights of respondent. Having 
presented herself at the border for admission, and having 
subjected herself to the criminal enforcement powers of the 
federal government, 19 U. S. C. § 482, respondent was enti-
tled to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. But 
not only is the expectation of privacy less at the border than 
in the interior, see, e. g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S., 
at 154; cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 515 (1983) 
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting), but the Fourth Amendment bal-
ance between the interests of the government and the pri-
vacy right of the individual is struck much more favorably to 
the government at the border. Ante(~lP. 
We have no~~_ousl decided what level of suspicion 
would "_!Isti C"'.__a: seiZure f an i~trave er !orpurposes 
other than a routine bor er search. Cf. a e ~' at 
618, n:J.3. e Court of Appeals held that the initial deten-
tion of respondent was permissible only if the inspectors pos-
sessed a "clear indication" of alimentary canal smuggling. 
731 F. 2d 1~2, citing Quintero- astra, supra; cf. M endez-Ji-
menez, supra. Thi c ear indication language comes from 
our opinion in Schmer · rnia, 384 U. S. 757 (1966), 
but we think that the Court of Appeals misapprehended the 
significance of that phrase in the context in which it was used 
in Schmerber. 3 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
viewed "clear indication" as an intermediate standard be-
3 In that case we stated: 
"The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment 
protects forbid any intrusion [beyond the body's surface] on the mere 
chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear 
indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental 
human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence 
may disappear unless there is an immediate search." 
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tween "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause." See 
Mendez-Jimenez, supra, 709 F. 2d, at~· But we think 
that the words in Schmerber were used to mdicate the neces-
sity for particularized suspicion that the evidence sought 
might be found within the body of the individual, rather than 
as enunciating still a third Fourth Amendment threshold be-
tween "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause." 
No other court, including this one, has ever adopted I 
Schmerber's "clear indication" language as a Fourth Amend-
ment standard. See, e. g., Winston v. Lee, Slip Op., at 6-7, 
-- U. S. -- (1985) (surgical removal of bullet for evi-
dence). Indeed, another Circuit Court of Appeals, faced 
with facts almost identical to this case, has adopted a less 
strict standard based upon reasonable suspicion. See 
United States v. Mosquera-Ramirez, 729 F. 2d 1352, 1355 
(CAll 1984). We do not think that the Fourth Amend-
ment's emphasis upon reasonableness is consistent with the 
creation of a third verbal standard in addition to "reasonable 
suspicion" and "probable cause"; we are dealing with a con-
stitutional requirement of reasonableness, not mens rea, see 
United States v. Bailey, 444 U. S. 394, 403-406 (1980), and 
subtle verbal gradations may obscure rather than elucidate 
the meaning of the provision in question. 
We hold that the detention of a traveller at the border, be-
yond tifeScope of a roudi1ec ustoms s earch and inspection, is 
justified at its inception if customs agents, considering all the 
facts surrouiiOiilgtiie fraverier and her trip, reasonably sus-
pect that the traveller is smuggling contraband m her ahmen-
ta.rycallal. 4 
' It is also important to note what we do not hold. Because the issues 
are not presented today we~at level of suspicion, if 
any, is required for non-routine border searches such as strip, body cavity, 
or involuntary x-ray searches. Both parties would have us decide the 
issue Of wfietlier aliens possess lesser Fourth Amendment rights at the 
border; that question was not raised in either court below and we do not 
consider it today. 
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The "reasonable suspicion" standard has been applied in a 
number of contexts and effects a needed balance between pri-
vate and public interests when law enforcement officials must 
make a limited intrusion on less than probable cause. It thus 
fits well into the situations involving alimentary canal smug-
gling at the border: this type of smuggling gives no external 
signs and inspectors will rarely possess probable cause to ar-
rest or search, yet governmental interests in stopping smug-
gling at the border are high indeed. Under this standard of-
ficials at the border must have a "particularized and objective 
basis for suspecting the particular person" of alimentary ca-
nal smuggling. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 
(1981), citing Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 21, n. 18. 
The facts, and their rational inferences, known to Customs 
inspectors in this case clearly supported a reasonable suspi-
cion that respondent was an alimentary canal smuggler. We 
need not belabor the facts, including respondent's implausible 1 
story, that supported this suspicion, see supra text at J-4. A 
The trained Customs inspectors had encountered many ali-
mentary canal smugglers and certainly had more than an "in-
choate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch," Terry, 392 
U. S., at 27, that respondent was smuggling narcotics in her 
alimentary canal. The inspectors' suspicion was a "'com-
monsense conclusio[n] about human behavior' upon which 
'practical people,' including government officials, are entitled 
to rely." T. L. 0 ., supra, slip op., at 19, -- U. S. --, 
citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). 
The final issue in this case is whether the detention of re-
spondent was reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances which justified it initially. In this regard we have 
cautioned that courts should not indulge in "unrealistic sec-
ond guessing," Sharpe, supra, at?, and we have noted that 
"creative judges, engaged in potll hoc evaluations of police 
conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means 
by which the objectives .of the police might have been accom-
plished," !d. But "the fact that the protection of the public 
1/ 
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might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by 'less inclu-
sive' means does not, in itself, render the search unreason-
able." Id., citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 447 
(1983). Authorities must be allowed "to graduate their re-
sponse to the demands of any particular situation." Place, 
462 U. S., at 709, n. 10. Here, respondent was detained in-
communicado for almost 16 hours before inspectors sought a 
warrant; the warrant then took a number of hours to procure, 
through no apparent fault of the inspectors. This length of 
time undoubtedly exceeds any other detention we have ap-
proved under reasonable suspicion. But we have also con-
sistently rejected hard-and-fast time limits, Sharpe; Place, 
supra, at 709, n. 10. Instead, "common sense and ordinary 
human experience must govern over rigid criteria." Sharpe, 
supra, atj. 
The ru'dimentary knowledge of the human body which 
judges poSseSs in coiliiiiOn with the rest Ofhumankind tells us 
thatailmentary cana smuggling canllOfbe detected in the 
amount of time in which other illegal activity may be investi-
gated through brief Terry-type stops. It presents few, if 
any external signs; a quick frisk will not do, nor will even a 
strip search. In the case of respondent the inspectors had 
available, as a~ ~ernative to simply awaiting her bowel 
movement, anf-X-ray. They offered her the alternative of 
submitting herself to that procedure. But when she refused 
that alternative, the Customs inspectors were left with only 
two practical alternatives: detain her for such time as neces-
sary to confirm their suspicions, a detention which would last 
much longer than the typical "Terry" stop, or turn her loose 
into the interior E:easonably suspected contraband drugs (}) 
~ c~~t_~'lv7~ 
The inspectors in this case followed this former procedure. 
They no doubt expected that respondent, having recently dis-
embarked from a 10-hour direct flight with a full and stiff ab-
domen, would produce a bowel movement without extended 
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which the court below labeled "heroic," disappointed this 
expectation and in turn caused her humiliation and discom-
fort. Our prior cases have refused to charge police with de-
lays in investigatory detention attributable to the suspect's 
evasive actions, see Sharpe, supra, at 11-12; id., at 9 (MAR-
SHALL, J., concurring in judgment), and that principle ap-
plies here as well. Respondent alone was responsible for 
much of the duration and discomfort of the seizure. 
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the detention 
in this case was not unreasonably long. It occurred at the 
international border, where the Fourth Amendment balance 
of interests leans heavily to the government. At the border, 
Customs officials have more than merely an investigative law 
enforcement role. They are also charged, along with Immi-
gration officials, with protecting this nation from entrants 
who may bring anything harmful into this country, whether 
that be communicable diseases, narcotics, or explosives. 
See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1182(a)(23); 1182(a)(6); 1222; 19 CFR 
§§162.4-162.7. See also 19 U.S.C. §482; 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1103(a). In this regard the detention of a suspected ali-
mentary canal smuggler at the border is analogous to the de-
tention of a suspected tuberculosis carrier at the border: both 
are detained until their bodily processes dispel the suspicion 
that they will introduce a harmful agent into this country. 
Cf. 8 U. S. C. § 1222; 42 CFR pt. 34; 19 U. S. C. §§ 482, 1582. 
Respondent's detention was long, uncomfortable, indeed, \ 
humiliating; but both its length and its discomfort r~ed 
solely from the method by which sh c ose to smuggle illicit 
drugs into is coun ry. n Adams v. Williams, 40 U. S. 
143~-stop case, we said that "the Fourth 
Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the pre-
cise level of information necessary for probable cause to ar-
rest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur 
or a criminal to escape." 407 U. S., at 145. Here, by anal-
ogy, in the presence of articulable suspicion of smuggling in 
her alimentary canal, the Customs officers were not required 
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by the Fourth Amendment to pass respondent and her 88 co-
caine-filled balloons into the interior. Her detention for the 
period of time necessary to either verify or dispel the suspi-
cion was not unreasonable. The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is therefore 
Reversed. 
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